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Same-Sex Privacy and the Limits of
Antidiscrimination Law
Amy Kapczynski
Whereas a "customer preference" will not justify a job qualification
based on sex, an invasion of privacy will.'
[M]ores as to being viewed naked by members of the opposite sex
under certain circumstances are bound to change as women become
further integrated into the occupational and professional world. The
traditional rule that only male guards may view male inmates under
these conditions may derive from just the type of stereotypical
value system condemned by Title VII.
2
1. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,3 as it has been interpreted by the
courts, is an uncompromising statute. It bars adverse employment actions
taken on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin, with only
one exception: in cases where an employer can demonstrate that sex,
religion, or national origin is a "bona fide occupational qualification
[BFOQ] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
1. Backus v. Baptist Med, Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated as moot,
671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982).
2. Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 462 F. Supp. 952, 956 n.4 (N.D. Iowa 1979)
(citation omitted), aff'd, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1980).
3. The statute reads, in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
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business or enterprise., 4 Much of Title VII's impact, of course, depends
upon the scope given to this exception, and, in particular, upon whether
employers are allowed to claim inconvenience, cost, or customer preference
as legitimate components of the BFOQ analysis. Because a broad exception
would swallow the rule, the Supreme Court has held that the BFOQ
provision was "meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the general
prohibition of discrimination ' 5 and established a stringent test for its
application. An employer seeking a sex-based BFOQ must have a "'factual
basis"' to believe that "'all or substantially all women [or men] would be
unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved,' ' ,6 or,
alternatively, demonstrate that the qualification in question relates to "the
'essence,' or to the 'central mission of the employer's business."' 7
Courts have also strongly rejected attempts to define the "essence of a
business" in ways that allow sex discrimination in through the back door of
customer preference. The logic is the same as that justifying a narrow
BFOQ: As one court put it, "[I]t would be totally anomalous if we were to
allow the preferences and prejudices of the customers to determine whether
the sex discrimination was valid. Indeed, it was, to a large extent, these very
prejudices the Act was meant to overcome."8 Thus, courts have refused to
allow the preferences of airline customers to justify rejection of men for
flight attendant positions,9 or the biases of customers or associates in other
countries to justify refusal to promote women to positions directing
international operations. 0
To date, only a few kinds of sex-based BFOQs have been approved.
The Supreme Court has authorized only one: In 1977, the Court granted a
sex-based BFOQ to an Alabama maximum security prison, allowing it to
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1). The BFOQ provision of Title VII reads:
[lit shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ
employees.., on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain
instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise.
Id.
5. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977); see also UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991) ("The BFOQ defense is written narrowly, and this Court has read it
narrowly.... Our emphasis on the restrictive scope of the BFOQ defense is grounded on both the
language and the legislative history of § 703." (citations omitted)).
6. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333 (quoting Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235
(5th Cir. 1969)).
7. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 203 (citations omitted).
8. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971); see also I LEX
K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 11.02, at 11-6 (2d ed. 2002) ("[Clourts have
uniformly rejected asserted BFOQs that are based on customer or client preferences, usually citing
the fact that these biases are exactly the type of discrimination that Title VII was designed to
eliminate.").
9. E.g., Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388; Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D.
Tex. 1981).
10. Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1981).
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exclude women from certain positions to ensure the safe administration of
the prison."1 Lower courts and commentators have suggested that there may
be many other kinds of BFOQs, including an "authenticity" BFOQ, which,
for example, allows employers to hire only women for special undercover
operations or theater productions, 2 a "role model" BFOQ, 3 and a BFOQ
for rehabilitation purposes. 1
4
Sex-based BFOQs are of interest not only because they authorize acts
that would otherwise be considered discriminatory, but because they are a
key location where sexual difference is symbolized in the law. If the law
"interpellates" us, or recruits us into identities and ideologies that it names
for and as us,' 5 then sex-based BFOQs offer us a unique vantage point from
which to understand how we are created as legal subjects of sex. This Note
examines one sex-based 13F0Q, which eclipses all others in terms of its
legitimacy, persistence, and breadth: the same-sex privacy BFOQ, which
allows employers explicitly to exclude men or women from certain
positions or employment opportunities to protect the privacy interests of
customers of the opposite sex. It excuses a wide variety of overtly sex-
based employment actions, from the seemingly trivial-the refusal to assign
women to clean men's bathrooms' 6-to the relatively extreme-the refusal
to hire qualified men to fill any of the nursing positions in labor and
delivery rooms.' 
7
In 1991, the Supreme Court explicitly suggested that same-sex privacy
could be the basis for a BFOQ,18 and both before and after that, lower
courts have granted same-sex privacy BFOQs in a variety of contexts
11. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334-35.
12. See 29 CF.R. § 1604.2(a)(i)-(2) (2001) (indicating that BFOQs will not be granted on
the basis of "the preferences of coworkers, the employer, clients or customers except... [w]here
it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness"); 3 LARSON, supra note 8,
§ 43.02[2], at 43-5.
13. See Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 705 (8th Cir. 1987).
14. See Torres v. Wis. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1529-32 (7th Cir.
1988).
15. "Interpellation" is the term Louis Althusser gave to the law's power to call subjects into
being. Althusser's privileged metaphor for interpellation is the moment when an individual in the
street, hailed by a policeman who shouts, "Hey, you there!", turns to face the officer, becoming
the "you" that was called. See Louis Althusser, ldeology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes
Toward an Investigation), in LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 127, 170-77 (Ben
Brewster trans., 1971).
16. Norwood v. Dale Maint- Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410 (N.D. Il1. 1984); Brooks v. ACF
Indus., Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. W. Va. 1982).
17. EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr., 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 159 (W.D. Okla. 1982);
Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacatedas moot, 671 F.2d 1100
(8th Cir. 1982).
18. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206 n.4 (1991) (noting that "[n]othing
in our discussion of the 'essence of business test,' however, suggests that sex could not constitute
a BFOQ when privacy interests are implicated," and characterizing Backus as holding that the
"essence of obstetric nurse's business is to provide sensitive care for patient's intimate and private
concerns" (citingBackus, 510 F. Supp. 1191)).
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including labor and delivery rooms, 9 mental hospitals,
2 0 youth centers, 2 1
washrooms,22 and nursing homes.23 Some courts have also granted same-
sex privacy BFOQs in prisons,24 although many others have rejected
them.2 5 Recently, employers have begun claiming-if not obtaining-
BFOQ defenses in a variety of new settings, including weight-loss
centers,26 health clubs,
27 and spas.28
This Note addresses same-sex privacy cases because in them Title VII's
strong command to remake the world in favor of employment equity and at
the expense of discriminatory customer preferences meets its limit. These
cases are striking not only because they appear to be the strongest category
of sex-based exceptions to Title VII, but also because they are deeply
untheorized and impossible to square with Title VII's much-vaunted
rejection of customer preference. As Robert Post has pointed out, same-sex
privacy cases illustrate how "Title VII does not simply displace gender
practices, but rather interacts with them in a selective manner," and they
also "force[] us to ask which gender practices are to be reshaped by Title
VII, in what contexts, and in what ways. 29
19. Mercy Health Ctr., 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 159; Backus, 510 F. Supp. 1191.
20. Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that
sex is a BFOQ in a youth psychiatric facility); Jennings v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health,
786 F. Supp. 376 (S.D.N.Y 1992), affd, 977 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1992).
21. City of Philadelphia v. Pa. Human Relations Comm'n, 300 A.2d 97 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1973).
22. Brooks v. ACF Indus., 537 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. W. Va. 1982).
23. Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978), affd mem., 591
F.2d 1334 (3rd Cir. 1979).
24. See, e.g., Hudson v. Goodlander, 494 F. Supp. 890, 893 (D. Md. 1980) (holding that the
interests of female guards in equal employment opportunities were not compelling enough to
override male inmates' privacy rights in situations where inmates were regularly viewed naked).
25. See, e.g., Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1217 (2d Cir. 1980) (denying a sex-based BFOQ
for prison guards assigned to night shifts in women's prison dormitories because measures to
accommodate inmate privacy concerns were available); Griffin v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 654 F.
Supp. 690, 702 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (rejecting a BFOQ because the viewing of unclothed inmates
was not "intrinsically more odious" when the surveillance was cross-sex); Harden v. Dayton
Human Rehab. Ctr., 520 F. Supp. 769, 781 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (rejecting a female-sex BFOQ for a
prison guard position because the employer had not demonstrated that it could not rearrange job
duties so as to avoid the conflict between privacy and equal employment), aff'd, 779 F.2d 50 (6th
Cir. 1985); Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 462 F. Supp. 952, 957 (N.D. Iowa 1979)
(refusing to grant a male-sex BFOQ for corrections officers in a men's penal institution because
institutional adjustments could be made to respect inmate privacy without hindering the operation
of the facility), aft'd, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1980).
26. EEOC v. HI 40 Corp., 953 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mo. 1996).
27. Foster v. Back Bay Spas, Inc., No. 96-7060, 1997 Mass. Super. LEXIS 194 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Sept. 29, 1997). For feminist defenses of women-only health clubs that refuse to hire men, see
Miriam A. Cherry, Exercising the Right to Public Accommodations: The Debate over Single-Sex
Health Clubs, 52 ME. L. REV. 97 (2000); and Michael R. Evans, The Case for All-Female Health
Clubs: Creating a Compensatory Purpose Exception to State Public Accommodation Laws, 11
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 307 (1999).
28. Olsen v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (D. Ariz. 1999).
29. See Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination
Law, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1, 26 (2000).
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But how are we to know or decide which gender practices Title VII
should challenge? This Note derives two teachings from same-sex privacy
cases: first, that we must consider the symbolically as well as materially
discriminatory effects of gender norms to decide which norms to challenge,
and, second, that our inquiry must not end there. These cases make clear
that costs attach not only to gender norms but also to their transformation.
At times, courts will need to mediate between the discriminatory effects of
a norm and the discriminatory effects of the attempt to change it. In such
cases, I contend, effective resolution of this dilemma will usually not reside
in sex segregation, but rather in non-sex-specific measures to alleviate the
kinds of risks and costs we too quickly identify with sex itself.
Part II demonstrates that the same-sex privacy doctrine fails to meet the
stringent requirements established for BFOQs. There is no evidence in most
same-sex privacy cases that all or substantially all members of one sex
cannot perform the essential functions of the job in question. In fact, same-
sex privacy BFOQs are simply concessions to customer preference, and
they undermine employment equity in just the way that courts usually have
held Title VII opposes.
Courts in search of a principle that distinguishes the grounds of this
BFOQ from forbidden customer preference typically turn to the law of
privacy, but as Part III shows, this turn is too quickly made. Upon
examination, it becomes clear that there are in many cases no relevant
privacy rights at stake. Even in cases where there are privacy rights at stake,
there is no logical reason to collapse privacy rights with sex and status as
same-sex privacy doctrine does.
If same-sex privacy cases are really about customer preferences, and
cannot be defended via recourse to legally recognized privacy rights, how
can they be explained? Part IV contends that there are two interrelated
justifications at work in these cases. First, courts insist that same-sex
privacy norms are so deeply held and so fundamental to our sense of
identity that they are legitimately cast beyond the reach of
antidiscrimination law. Second, courts imply that same-sex privacy norms
should be respected because they are necessary for the physical and
psychological protection of individuals.
Part V asks whether either line of reasoning adequately justifies the
exclusion of same-sex privacy norms from the set of gender norms that
Title VII contests. It contends that they do not and that same-sex privacy
doctrine is both materially and symbolically discriminatory. The claim of
material discrimination is straightforward: The same-sex privacy BFOQ
disadvantages women in the labor market because it facilitates the steering
of women into low-status jobs. The notion of symbolic discrimination is
less familiar, and one that I attempt to define against the background of
these cases. Same-sex privacy cases, I argue, reinforce a symbolic order of
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gender that has a discriminatory effect upon women, because, for example,
it casts them as constitutively vulnerable to sexualized attack, and as
essentially and necessarily modest in a way that resonates with tendencies
to propertize women and deny them sexual agency. These and the other
symbolically discriminatory effects of the doctrine should concern us, and
Title VII. These cases, however, suggest that it is not enough to ask which
norms to challenge: We must also consider where and when to challenge
them. Where changing gender norms will occasion costs such as the fear or
risk of sexual abuse, we should take these costs seriously. Sex segregation,
however, will rarely be the most effective way of avoiding these costs.
Because of this, I conclude, same-sex privacy BFOQs should rarely, if ever,
be judged legitimate.
II. THE BONA FIDES OF SAME-SEX PRIVACY
In Dothard v. Rawlinson, the Supreme Court set a high bar for BFOQ
exceptions, offering two tests for the granting of the defense. A BFOQ can
be justified if "'the essence of the business operation would be undermined
by not hiring members of one sex exclusively,"'3 0 or if employers have
"'reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or
substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently
the duties of the job involved."'
31
Courts read these requirements narrowly and strictly. Focusing on the
wording of the statute, the Supreme Court has insisted that "the most telling
term is 'occupational'; this indicates that these objective, verifiable
requirements must concern job-related skills and aptitudes."32 In UA W v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., the Court demonstrated the rigor of this
requirement by refusing to define fetal safety as part of the essence of the
business of battery making, noting, "No one can disregard the possibility of
injury to future children; the BFOQ, however, is not so broad that it
transforms this deep social concern into an essential aspect of battery
making.
33
The Johnson Controls Court also circumscribed the ability of
employers to claim cost as a factor supporting the need for a BFOQ.34 As a
30. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977) (quoting Diaz v. Pan Am. World
Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971)).
31. Id. (quoting Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969)).
32. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991).
33. Id. at 203-04.
34. Dismissing Justice White's concurrence, the majority noted that "[bly limiting his
discussion to cost and safety concerns and rejecting the 'essence of the business' test that our case
law has established, [Justice White] seeks to expand what is now the narrow BFOQ defense." Id.
at 203. Additionally, by requiring that employers bear the risk of tort liability in this case-one
that the majority characterized as "remote," id. at 208, but that the concurrence considered much
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rule, courts do not consider cost a legitimate justification for evading the
requirements of antidiscrimination law. 35 The rejection of cost as a
justification is essential to Title VII's power, since "[t]o allow this physical
limitation to become an independent ground for continued discrimination
because of the expense of adapting to the 'new era' would be nothing less
than honoring a self-perpetuating vehicle of discrimination."36
For the same reason, discriminatory customer preferences are also
unacceptable grounds for a BFOQ, according to both EEOC regulations
3 7
and the courts. 38 For example, in Diaz v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc., the Fifth Circuit sharply refused a BFOQ based upon sex to an airline
that wanted to hire only female flight attendants, holding that the proffered
justifications-the preferences and "special psychological needs of [airline]
passengers"-were not part of the "primary function" of an airline.39
If costs and customer preference are not legitimate factors in the BFOQ
analysis, why do courts consider same-sex privacy a legitimate basis for a
BFOQ? Many courts have struggled with this question; more have avoided
it. In one of the earliest and most oft-cited same-sex privacy cases, Fesel v.
Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc., a Delaware district court considered
whether to grant a same-sex BFOQ to a residential retirement home in order
to allow it to hire only female nurse's aides a.4 The court followed Dothard
in declaring that the employer must prove a factual basis for believing that
hiring any male nurse's aides would "directly undermine the essence of the
job involved or the employer's business," and that there was no way to
more likely, id. at 212-14 (White, J., concurring) -the Court minimized the role of cost concerns
in the BFOQ context.
35. 1 LARSON, supra note 8, § 11.02[4], at 1 -12. Larson notes:
The added expense cntailed in complying with Title VII is generally not a valid basis
for a bona fide occupational qualification. Thus, the cost of hiring members of two
sexes instead of one, in the form of constructing separate restrooms, berths, showers,
and the like, or in the form of increased costs of insurance or pension benefits, is not a
basis for a bona fide occupational qualification exception unless the expense in the
circumstances would be clearly unreasonable.
Id.
36. Id. § 11.02[4], at 11-15.
37. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)-(2) (2001).
38. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1971).
Similarly, courts have rejected sex-based discrimination in favor of male waiters in "high-class"
restaurants. Levendos v. Stem Entm't, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 1104, 1107 (W.D. Pa. 1989), rev'don
other grounds, 909 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1990); see also 3 LARSON, supra note 8, § 43.03[2], at 43-
37 to -38. Commentators note that the black letter rule against customer preference does not
extend to cases where "the distinctiveness of the product itself would be lost" (as in, for example,
a topless bar). 3 LARSON, supra note 8, § 43.03[4], at 43-49; see also Wilson v. Southwest
Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 301 (N.D. Tex. 1981) ("[I]n jobs where sex or vicarious sexual
recreation is the primary service provided, e.g. a social escort or topless dancer, the job
automatically calls for one sex exclusively; the employee's sex and the service provided are
inseparable.").
39. Diaz, 442 F.2d at 387-88.
40. 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd mem., 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979).
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reassign job duties so as to avoid the privacy/equality conflict.4 To prove
this factual basis, the court then promptly turned to evidence of customer
preference, noting:
The administrators of the Home believed that the employment of a
male nurse's aide at the Home would have undermined the essence
of the Home's operation because female guests would not consent
to having their personal needs attended to by a male, and because
some of the female guests would leave the Home if there were male
nurse's aides.
42
In the same-sex privacy context, not only customer preference but also
potential cost is considered an important aspect of the employer's
consideration, in direct contradiction to the rest of BFOQ doctrine. In Fesel,
the court held that it was simply "not feasible" for the nursing home in
question to hire an additional staff person-presumably because of the
cost.4 3 Similarly, in Norwood v. Dale Maintenance System, Inc., an Illinois
district court allowed a BFOQ for sex-based assignments for washroom
janitors, after explicitly considering the cost of alternative staffing
arrangements and changing the locks on bathroom doors.44 That court even
went so far as to make customer preference itself part of the test for a same-
sex privacy BFOQ.4 5
The problem is the same one that attends all concessions to customer
preference: They exactly reproduce the prejudices that generate gendered
stratification and hierarchy in the work force in the first place. Note for a
moment the partiality of a privacy regime constructed on employers'
presumptions about customer preferences. The employers in Fesel, as in
other nursing care cases, refused to hire male nurses to care for female
patients, but they regularly allowed female nurses to provide intimate care
for male patients.46 Similarly, the same hospitals that refused to allow male
41. Id. at 1351.
42. Id. at 1352.
43. Id. at 1353.
44. Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1418 (N.D. Il1. 1984).
45. The court stated:
A defendant in privacy rights cases may satisfy its burden of proving a factual basis for
a sex-based hiring policy by showing that the clients or guests of a particular business
would not consent to service by a member of the opposite sex, and that the clients or
guests would stop patronizing the business if members of the opposite sex were
allowed to perform the service.
Id. at 1416.
46. Fesel, 447 F. Supp. at 1353 n.5. The same was true of the defendant hospital in Backus v.
Baptist Medical Center, as Deborah Calloway notes:
[A]Ithough the opinion never discusses the duties of female nurses outside the
maternity ward, female nurses at Baptist do provide intimate care to male patients. The
hospital does not bar female nurses from positions requiring that they provide intimate
care to male patients. Female nurses bathe male patients, help them use the toilet,
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nurses to provide intimate care for female patients regularly allowed male
doctors to provide such care for female patients. 47 As Deborah Calloway
has pointed out, the same-sex privacy doctrine as currently constructed
reinforces sex segregation in some of the most stubbornly segregated
sectors of the U.S. labor market. Because it relies upon received wisdom
about privacy, the current approach "expressly maintains the status quo.
Intimate contact.., is acceptable when.., females fill their traditional role
as nurses and males fill their traditional role as doctors, police officers and
prison guards. Privacy interests are asserted and prevail when men or
women attempt to break into the traditionally segregated professions. 48
As Calloway intimates, sexual privacy BFOQs are sought and granted
in ways that reinforce the hierarchical segregation of the job market.
Consider: If women cannot be assigned male nurses for intimate care but
men can be assigned female nurses, hospitals and courts are defending rules
that help ensure that women will continue to dominate the nursing field.
Consider too the compound effect that the exception for male doctors has:
Men are steered into highly paid, high-prestige doctor positions, while
women are expected to staff lower-paid nursing positions. The only
plausible explanation for this professionalism bias is gendered job
stereotyping.
49
administer shots and give them enemas. As a matter of practice rather than policy, male
orderlies and male nurses insert catheters in male patients and shave their genital hair in
preparation for surgery.
Deborah Calloway, Equal Employment and Third Party Privacy Interests: An Analytical
Frameworkfor Reconciling Competing Rights, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 327, 355 (1985).
47. In EEOC v. Mercy Health Center, both of the doctors who "perform[edl" most of the
deliveries in the ward were male. 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 159, 161 (W.D. Okla. 1982). At
Baptist Medical Center, nine of the eleven ob-gyn doctors were men. Backus v. Baptist Mcd. Ctr.,
510 F. Supp. 1191, 1192 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated as moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982). In
Backus, the court dismissed this issue by accepting at face value Baptist Medical's policy of
allowing patients to choose their doctors but not their nurses:
The fact that the plaintiff is a health care professional does not eliminate the fact that he
is an unselected individual who is intruding on the obstetrical patient's right to privacy.
The male nurse's situation is not analogous to that of the male doctor who has been
selected by the patient.
Id. at 1195.
48. Calloway, supra note 46, at 329-30. 1 take a slightly different view of the prison cases.
Courts frequently value employment equity over privacy in the prison context, which sometimes
has the effect of facilitating women's entry into the traditionally male domain of corrections. See
infra note 52.
49. Calloway, supra note 46, at 361-62. Interestingly enough, this gendered regime is a fairly
recent one. Until the late nineteenth century, and the famous Florence Nightingale, nursing was
male work. After Nightingale, hospital "dirty work" became "women's work." See Henry
Etzkowitz, The Male Sister: Sexual Separation of Labor in Society, 33 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 431,
432 (1971), quoted in Calloway, supra note 46, at 360 n.161. These norms may be slowly
changing, particularly regarding doctors. Men still make up about sixty-four percent of practicing
ob-gyn doctors, but women are now the majority of ob-gyn doctors-in-training. See Tamar Lewin,
Women's Health Is No Longer a Man's World, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2001, at Al. Last year, more
than seventy percent of the nation's ob-gyn residencies were filled by women. Id. Male ob-gyn
doctors have begun to complain that they feel discriminated against because women prefer female
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As they authorize the exclusion of men from "women's" professions,
courts have also authorized the exclusion of women from typically male
professions such as janitorial work 50 and youth supervision in juvenile
correction facilities. 5' The doctrine as it is currently constructed allows
employers to make use of privacy rhetoric to justify giving patients only
those choices that employers either want to or can comfortably grant, which
are-not incidentally-those that comport with job stereotypes and the
gender-segregated labor market that Title VII aspires to change.
52
doctors. Id. Several have filed discrimination cases in the federal courts. See, e.g., Underkofler v.
Cmty. Health Care Plan, Inc., No. 99-7838, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 19040 (2d Cir. Aug. 4, 2000)
(rejecting the plaintiff's claim of sex discrimination because the defendant produced evidence that
it terminated the plaintiff on legitimate, nondiscriminatory grounds); Veleanu v. Beth Israel Med.
Ctr., No. 98 Civ. 7455, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13948 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2000) (rejecting the sex
and age discrimination claims of a male ob-gyn doctor because the plaintiff did not make a prima
facie showing of discrimination and the defendant advanced legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
for the plaintiff's dismissal). I suspect that courts would not be persuaded that female patients'
privacy rights are grounds for BFOQs in these cases, in large part because women have long been
attended to by male ob-gyns. It is hard to believe, however, that the privacy claims made are
inherently more persuasive in the nursing context-suggesting that what courts are bowing to is
preferences that have been constructed by historical sex segregation in the labor market, not
"privacy."
50. Brooks v. ACF Indus., Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. W. Va. 1982). The court found male
gender to be a BFOQ for assignment to janitorial duties in a male bathhouse. Id. at 1133. Male
janitors were employed to clean the women's bathhouse, but the court dismissed this as inapposite
because the men's bathhouse was in more constant use, making it impractical to mandate two
times during the day that it would be closed for cleaning. Id. at 1125 n.8.
51. City of Philadelphia v. Pa. Human Relations Comm'n, 300 A.2d 97, 104 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1973) (granting a same-sex privacy BFOQ for Youth Supervisor positions in a male juvenile
correction facility).
52. The only prominent exception to this case involves prisons, where courts regularly reject
BFOQs, inverting the usual tendency to value privacy over employment rights. In a few early
cases, courts granted same-sex BFOQs to exclude women guards from positions where they
would have to observe male inmates unclothed. See, e.g., Bowling v. Enomoto, 514 F. Supp. 201,
204 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (following "the trend in other courts" and holding that inmates in an all-
male facility have "a right to be free from... unrestricted observation... by prison officials of
the opposite sex"); Hudson v. Goodlander, 494 F. Supp. 890, 893 (D. Md. 1980) (holding that
women guards' interests in equal employment opportunities were not compelling enough to
override male inmates' privacy rights in situations where inmates were regularly viewed naked);
Iowa Dep't of Soc. Servs., Iowa Men's Reformatory v. Iowa Merit Employment Dep't, 261
N.W.2d 161, 165 (Iowa 1977) (holding, under Iowa's analogous BFOQ provision, that a men's
prison could refuse to promote women to positions that involved close personal contact with male
prisoners, and considering "obvious... the existence of a personal right of privacy with respect to
one's own body and bodily functions"). But many courts have rejected BFOQs that would exclude
female guards, generally because employers could not prove that job assignments could not be
reorganized to avoid the conflict between privacy and employment rights. See, e.g., Hardin v,
Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364 (1 lth Cir. 1982); Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612
F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1980); Griffin v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 654 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
When female inmates' privacy rights are considered, courts also commonly reject BFOQs. See,
e.g., Forts v. Ward, 621 F,2d 1210, 1216 (2d Cir. 1980) (denying a sex-based BFOQ for prison
guards assigned to night shifts in women's dormitories because other measures to accommodate
inmate privacy concerns were available); Everson v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 222 F. Supp. 2d 864
(E.D. Mich. 2002). But see Robino v. Iranon, 145 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1998) (granting a BFOQ
exception to accommodate female inmates' privacy interests and to reduce the risk of sexual
conduct between corrections officers and inmates).
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Ill. THE FAILURE OF SAME-SEX PRIVACY AS PRIVACY LAW
Of course, if there is something special about "privacy" that justifies
the outcome in same-sex privacy cases, then it may be that we-and Title
VII-simply ought to accept the deference to preference and the
discriminatory effects that it has. Courts often suggest that there is
something special about privacy, which both distinguishes it from customer
preference and justifies the discriminatory impact that our desire for privacy
produces.
Some courts try to draw a special solicitude for privacy from Title VIIor its legislative history. If the statute sets privacy apart, courts, of course,
would also have reason to do so. Privacy, however, is not mentioned in
Title VII, and, as in most sex-related cases, the legislative history offers
little assistance in interpreting the statute. Some courts have made muchof stray remarks in the congressional debates about Title VII, such as this
comment by Representative Charles E. Goodell:
There are so many instances where the matter of sex is a bona fideoccupational qualification. For instance, I think of an elderly
woman who wants a female nurse. There are many things of thisnature which are bona fide occupational qualifications, and it seems
to me they would be properly considered here as an exception. 54
53. Courts and commentators alike regularly note that the congressional record is of littlehelp in understanding Title VII's application to sex discrimination. See, e.g., Michael L. Sirota,Sex Discrimination: Title VIl and the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification, 55 TEX. L. RFV.1025, 1027 (1977). Title VII preceded any serious national consideration of gender discriminationin the workplace, and the stories about how sex came to be included are legion. Sex was added onthe last day before Title VII was passed, and many have suggested that the inclusion wassomething of a joke, intended by opponents of racial desegregation to derail the passage of the billaltogether. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986) (noting that"[tihe prohibition against discrimination based on sex was added to Title VII at the last minute onthe floor of the House of Representatives" and that therefore "we are left with little legislativehistory to guide us"); Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law. TheDisaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 14 n.48 (1995) (cataloguing numerous
judicial references to this history).
54. 110 CONG. REC. 2718 (1964) (statement of Rep. Goodell). The Backus court cites thisremark to support the claim that "[tlhe legislative history of the act suggests the BFOQ exceptionis appropriate in this case." Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1196 (E.D. Ark.1981), vacated as moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982).
Other members of Congress made similar remarks. For example, Representative Green
stated:
Let us take another example: In a large hospital an elderly woman needs special round-the-clock nursing. Her family is seeking to find a fully qualified registered nurse. Itdoes not make any difference to this family if the nurse is a white or a Negro or aChinese or a Japanese if she is fully qualified. But it does make a great deal ofdifference to this elderly woman and her family as to whether this qualified nurse is aman or a woman. Under the terms of the amendment adopted last Saturday the hospitalcould not advertise for a woman registered nurse because under the amendment by thegentleman from Virginia [Mr. SMfTH] this would be discrimination based on sex. The
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As Deborah Calloway has pointed out, however, the views of
individual members of Congress are not typically thought to be persuasive
evidence of congressional intent and are particularly unpersuasive when
read against the unusual legislative history of Title VII.55 It can thus be
concluded that "nothing in the language or history of the statute mandates"
that courts grant same-sex privacy BFOQs.
56
Because same-sex privacy BFOQs cannot be securely anchored in Title
VII or its legislative history, many courts attempt to anchor them in the law
of privacy. Thus, under the test that many courts adopt when considering
same-sex privacy cases, employers must not only demonstrate that they are
protecting the essence of their business and that there are no reasonable
alternatives to a sex-based hiring policy, but also that the customer privacy
interests being protected are entitled to protection under the law.57 Under
this argument, women do not merely prefer female nurses-they have a
right to them. So, for example, the court in Fesel insisted that
the attitudes of the nonconsenting female guests at the Home are
undoubtedly attributable to their upbringing and to sexual
stereotyping of the past. While these attitudes may be characterized
as "customer preference," this is, nevertheless, not the kind of case
governed by the regulatory provision that customer preference
alone cannot justify a job qualification based upon sex. Here
personal privacy interests are implicated which are protected by
law and which have to be recognized by the employer in running its
business.58
The trouble in Fesel, as in other cases that involve nursing care, is that
every legal right that patients have to privacy is rendered irrelevant by the
fact that patients must consent to medical procedures. Medical procedures
may not be undertaken without a patient's consent, absent unusual
circumstances. 59 Thus, as Calloway has noted, "[t]o find an intrusion,
suggestion of the gentleman from New York [Mr. GOODELL] helped a great deal,
however.
See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 2720 (1964) (statement of Rep. Green).
55. Calloway, supra note 46, at 353 n.123.
56. Id. at 352.
57. See, e.g., Jennings v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 786 F. Supp. 376, 380-81
(S.D.N.Y. 1992), aft'd, 977 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1992); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447
F. Supp. 1346, 1351 (D. Del. 1978).
58. Fesel, 447 F. Supp. at 1352.
59. Surgery on a person is a technical assault, assault and battery, or trespass unless the
patient or some authorized person consented to it, regardless of the skill and care used. See, e.g.,
Gray v. Grunnagle, 223 A.2d 663, 668-69 (Pa. 1966); Physicians' & Dentists' Bus. Bureau v.
Dray, 111 P.2d 568, 569 (Wash. 1941). In an emergency where immediate action is necessary to
protect life, and where it is impractical to obtain actual consent, an inference of consent to medical
treatment can be made. See, e.g., Danielson v. Roche, 241 P.2d 1028, 1029-31 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
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assault or battery when the medical practitioner is of a different sex than the
patient, a court would need to find that the patient did not consent to the
treatment."60 Nursing care follows the same pattern.6' Patients may have an
underlying privacy right not to be exposed to the view of others,
particularly nonmedical personnel, without their consent, but once again,
consent is primary, and sex plays no legally decisive role in the matter.
62
Privacy torts and criminal actions can no more provide automatic
justification for sex-based hiring than they can for race-based hiring. While
individuals are free to decline medical care for any reason they like
(including the sex, race, or hair color of the provider), it is up to the courts
to decide whether we will facilitate such choices where they conflict with
antidiscrimination law.
While courts may be right that there is an underlying privacy right at
stake in scenes of bodily exposure (which is not, for example, at stake in the
airline cases), they are wrong to attribute a sex to this right and to evacuate
the central relation between this right and consent.63 Once one begins to ask
why it is less private to be seen in a state of undress by one sex rather than
the other, the foundational logic of the same-sex privacy cases rapidly
breaks down. 64 The fact is, in no other realm of law does the "privacy" of
an act depend upon not just who sees which body under what conditions,
but also upon what sex the viewer is. The consequences of such a rule in
1952) (holding that no action lies against a doctor who removed allegedly diseased fallopian tubes
that were discovered during a consented-to appendectomy).
60. Calloway, supra note 46, at 345.
61. id. at 344 ("[A]Ithough many of the procedures and treatments ordinarily performed and
administered by nurses and doctors on patients would be tortious acts absent consent, they are not
actionable because the patient has consented either expressly or by implication.").
62. See, e.g., Knight v. Penobscot Bay Med. Ctr., 420 A.2d 915, 916 (Me. 1980) (rejecting a
claim of intrusion upon seclusion in the labor and delivery room setting, where a patient was
exposed to the view of a nonmedical professional without her consent); see also De May v.
Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881). De May was the first U.S. case decided on grounds of privacy.
Mrs. Roberts sued De May, the doctor who attended her birth, because the doctor had brought
with him a "young unmarried man, a stranger to the plaintiff and uttcrly ignorant of the practice of
medicine," who carried the doctor's things and attended the delivery. Id. at 146. Here, too, lack of
effective consent was central to the court's decision. The claim was of deceit: The plaintiff
asserted that she had no idea the aptly named "Scattergood" was not a medical student or doctor,
and would not have allowed him to attend the birth if she had known. Id. at 147.
63. Calloway also points out that the imagined privacy violations may be too minimal to be
legally actionable, or to outweigh our collective interests in equal employment. Calloway, supra
note 46, at 348.
64. Indeed, when courts do question this logic, they tend to reject same-sex privacy BFOQs.
For example, in Olsen v. Marriott International, Inc., the court rejected a sex-based BFOQ for the
hiring of masseuses. 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (D. Ariz. 1999). Part of the court's problem with the
BFOQ claim was that the employer offered customers a choice of male or female masseuses. Id,
at 1064. If customers were being offered a choice, the court reasoned, then preferences, not
privacy, must be behind the BFOQ. Id. at 1076. It seems strange, however, to force employers
into an all-or-nothing discriminatory choice. Under Olsen's logic, either employers must require
all customers to have masseuses of the same sex, or they cannot accommodate customer wishes
for privacy. Thus, employers are encouraged to discriminate more than is necessary to meet actual
customer preferences in order to fit the constraints of the doctrine.
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tort law, for example, would be bizarre indeed. Imagine a plaintiff
photographed in an embarrassing position, say, with her skirt blown up
around her at the county fair.65 If she brings a tort claim because the
photograph is sent to hundreds of members of the Women's Junior League,
and only women see the photo, should the court dismiss the case because
there was no privacy violation? Individuals have privacy rights in tort
regardless of the sex of the intruder. Privacy has often been conceived of as
a series of concentric circles, and feminist theorists have noted that these
circles always have been implicitly gendered.66 In this case, however, the
circles are explicitly gendered-indeed, gendered as a matter of law.
Similarly, how can it be more or less private-as opposed to
comfortable, intuitive, pleasing, or embarrassing-to be seen in a state of
undress by a male nurse rather than by a male doctor? Consider again the
bizarre result that this rule of privacy would have upon the privacy tort: Our
unwittingly photographed plaintiff would have no legal claim if her picture
were circulated to the members of the American Medical Association, but
would have a claim if it were circulated to the American Nurses
Association.67
The claim made in Backus that constitutional privacy rights are at stake
in same-sex privacy BFOQ cases is similarly flawed. 68 The court does not
make clear where this right would come from or what its exact nature
would be, but consider the possible alternatives. If the court is imagining
some sort of penumbral right to same-sex privacy itself, rather than a choice
of same-sex privacy (note that Baptist Medical Center did not give its
patients a choice of same-sex nurses, but rather assigned all obstetrical
patients female nurses 69), from where does it derive the parameters of this
right? (Where, in other words, does privacy get its association with certain
genders, bodily zones, and professional statuses?) If Title VII violates this
right when it requires hospitals to employ male nurses in labor and delivery
rooms, why does it not also violate it in all of the other wards of a hospital
or nursing home where patients receive intimate care? Furthermore, a
constitutional right to same-sex privacy would imply that such a right must
be protected by any healthcare provider that could be considered a state
actor for these purposes-but no one claims that a patient not granted a
same-sex nurse has a constitutional cause of action against the provider.
65. Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 476 (Ala. 1964).
66. See, e.g., Anita L. Allen & Erin Mack, How Privacy Got Its Gender, 10 N. ILL. U. L.
RFV. 441 (1990).
67. 1 thank Kenji Yoshino for this point.
68. Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated as moot,
671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982) ("Defendant contends that if a male nurse is performing these
duties, the patient's constitutional right to privacy is violated. We agree with the defendant.").
69. Id.
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Unless the Constitution only guaranteed women same-sex privacy
rights, Title VII and providers that could be considered state actors would
have to afford men and women the same accommodation of their same-sex
privacy. As noted above, in both Fesel and Backus, men regularly received
intimate care from females-but neither court took legal, much less
constitutional, issue with that fact.70 Similarly, would the constitutional
right to same-sex privacy apply to nurses but not to doctors? (Recall that in
both Backus and Mercy Health Center, the same-sex care rule was applied
to nurses but not to doctors. 7 1) How could it be that women would have a
constitutional right to a same-sex nurse but men would not, or that women
would have a constitutional right to a same-sex nurse but not to a same-sex
doctor?
We might imagine a weaker constitutional right, drawn, for example,
from the decisional privacy doctrine, that guaranteed individuals a choice of
same-sex privacy. As elaborated in foundational reproductive freedom
cases such as Roe v. Wade,72 Eisenstadt v. Baird,73 and Griswold v.
Connecticut,7 4 decisional privacy offers us "a constitutional guarantee of a
certain spectrum of decisional freedom., 75 Justice Brennan gave the
decisional paradigm of privacy its most famous formulation in the
contraceptive case of Eisenstadt: "If the right of privacy means anything, it
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child. 76 The same problems apply:
Why would the Constitution allow women this choice but not men? Why
would this decisional right not apply to encounters with doctors, and to all
scenes of cross-sex exposure?
If we shift to the context of the janitorial cases, the claim that the same-
sex privacy BFOQ is underwritten by constitutional or common-law rights
becomes even more fantastic. In Norwood v. Dale, for example, the central
legal issue was whether or not the maintenance and management companies
of the Standard Oil building in Chicago could refuse to assign a female
janitor to a position cleaning men's bathrooms. If the plaintiff had been
assigned to the position, as she wished, she would have knocked on the
door before entering the bathroom, to warn any of the men inside. The court
found that even this alternative impermissibly infringed upon male
employees' privacy rights.77 No authority is offered to substantiate this
70. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
72. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
73. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
74. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
75. Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1446 (1992).
76. 405 U.S. at 453 (second emphasis added).
77. Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410 (N.D. 11. 1984). The court noted:
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asserted right, but as a common-law tort right it makes little sense.
Alternatively, the notion that we have a constitutional right not to have a
janitor of a different sex knock on the bathroom door is, in its most literal
sense, incredible.
There are, however, numerous same-sex privacy cases where the third
parties in question do have legally protected privacy rights, either because
of independent constitutional provisions like the Fourth Amendment, or
because they are not effectively consenting to the surveillance or touching
in question. Prisoners, for example, have Eighth Amendment rights that
women in privately run labor and delivery rooms do not have. But the
prison cases are the exception that proves the rule (that same-sex privacy
BFOQs do not have much to do with privacy rights)-because although the
argument for same-sex privacy rights in prisons is much stronger than in
nursing homes, courts are much less likely to grant same-sex privacy
BFOQs in prisons.78
The relative reluctance to grant same-sex privacy BFOQs in prisons can
perhaps be explained by the fact that prisoners' privacy rights, although
extant, are sharply circumscribed. 79 But this would not explain a striking
aspect of some prison cases: Uniquely, when considering same-sex privacy
claims in prisons, courts question the logic that conflates notions of privacy
with notions of sex. Thus, for example, the court in Gunther v. Iowa State
Men's Reformatory rejected a same-sex privacy BFOQ because there were
less-discriminatory means available to respect inmates' privacy." The court
did not reach the privacy right claim but insisted that the issue was much
more complicated than the defendant claimed:
[M]ores as to being viewed naked by members of the opposite sex
under certain circumstances are bound to change as women become
further integrated into the occupational and professional world....
The traditional rule that only male guards may view male inmates
Even the least intrusive alternative, the scheduled closing of the washrooms each day,
would still cause stress to tenants and guests when an attendant knocked on the
opposite sex's washroom's door to determine if the washroom were in use. A person
using the washroom at the time would not know if the attendant would, nevertheless,
enter the washroom, not realizing the washroom was still in use. Moreover, the knock
may not be heard due to distance from the door or the noise caused by running water.
Id. at 1422.
78. See supra note 52; see also John Dwight Ingram, Prison Guards and Inmates of Opposite
Genders: Equal Employment Opportunity Versus Right of Privacy, 7 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POLY 3, 4 (2000) ("[T]here remains a substantial amount of disagreement as to several specific
issues, especially visual observation of unclothed inmates, and pat-down, strip, and body cavity
searches.").
79. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979) ("[G]iven the realities of institutional
confinement, any reasonable expectation of privacy that a detainee retained necessarily would be
of a diminished scope.").
80. 462 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Iowa 1979).
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under these conditions may derive from just the type of
stereotypical value system condemned by Title VII. 8I
Similarly, in Griffin v. Michigan Department of Corrections, a court
rejected a same-sex privacy BFOQ, indicating that the viewing of unclothed
inmates was not "intrinsically more odious" when the surveillance was
cross-sex. 82 Rather than wax lyrical about the sacred nature of same-sex
privacy, as courts in the labor and delivery room context do, 83 courts in
prison cases are more likely to muse: "How odd it would be to find in the
eighth amendment a right not to be seen [naked] by the other sex."
84
Thus, in the prison context, courts resist the conflation of privacy rights
with same-sex privacy rights-in some cases even noting that sexing the
privacy right is problematic because it reinforces discriminatory gender
meanings that Title VII intends to change. 5 In nonprison settings, even
where litigants question the link between sex and privacy, courts summarily
dismiss such questions8 6 There could be many reasons for this; I will
suggest just two. First, prison cases much more regularly involve claims
about men's same-sex privacy interests than do other same-sex privacy
cases. 87 Courts may be more likely to resist the automatic sexing of the
privacy norm where the privacy of men is at stake because men's bodies are
seen as inherently less private than women's-an issue to which we will
return shortly. But courts also reject women's privacy interests in the prison
setting, suggesting another reason: Prisoners' bodies are seen as less
sacrosanct than the bodies exposed in cases like Backus and Norwood.
If we resist the temptation to reach for the "obvious," the following fact
is startlingly clear: Same-sex privacy doctrine cannot be defended with
recourse to the law of privacy. In many cases, the third parties in question
have no relevant privacy rights. Even where they do have such rights, it is
81. Id at 956 n.4 (citation omitted).
82. 654 F. Supp. 690, 701 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
83. See, e.g., Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (noting
that "the body involves the most sacred and meaningful of all privacy rights"), vacated as moot,
671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982).
84. Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 148 (7th Cir. 1995).
85. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
86. For example, in a suit challenging sex-based employment practices in mental hospitals in
Michigan, members of Local 567 insisted that "[tihe violation of the right of privacy would be just
as pronounced were the right defined in a constitutional sense or in the traditional tort sense,
without regard to the sex of the transgressor." Local 567 Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun.
Employees v. Michigan, 635 F. Supp. 1010, 1013 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (quoting the plaintiffs'
pleadings). The court rejected this, saying:
Not only is this an unrealistic view of human mores in this country, but it is contrary to
the law. Obviously most people would find it a greater intrusion of their dignity and
privacy to have their naked bodies viewed (or any number of personal services
performed) by a member of the opposite sex.
Id. at 1013-14.
87. See supra note 52.
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not self-evident that there is or ought to be a link between those privacy
rights and sex.
IV. REAL SEX AND SEXUAL PROFILING
It is clear that there is no law of privacy that demands that courts read
same-sex privacy BFOQs into Title VII, nor does the statute or legislative
history give authoritative reason to do so. Nonetheless, there is a logic to
these cases, which has two strands. First, courts consider a desire for same-
sex privacy as a "fact" of biological sex or a deep part of the cultural
construction of gender, and therefore something that the law should not
aspire to change. Second, courts engage in a kind of sexual profiling,
circumscribing a zone where gender, sexuality, and notions of physical and
psychic safety overlap. Under this view, the same-sex privacy BFOQ is a
concession to the way people experience cross-sex bodily exposure as a
threat or risk.
A. Protecting Sex/Gender
Some courts justify same-sex privacy BFOQs by invoking the
biological "fact" of sex itself. For example, in City of Philadelphia v.
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, the court protested:
The Commission suggests that no facts were adduced by the City in
support of its contention that personal contact under very intimate
circumstances must be limited to contacts between persons of the
same sex. Once again, the Commission seeksfacts in an area where
facts are not available.... The biological difference between men
and women which in turn produce [sic] psychological differences
are the facts that justify limiting personal contact under intimate
circumstances to those of the same sex.88
Thus, according to this court, the syllogism is simple: Biology begets
physiology begets law. "Sex" itself, understood as biological difference,
becomes the core of the private. Under this view, same-sex privacy is a
Title VII-free zone because it protects bodies themselves, that is, biological
sex difference or "real sex" itself-not "gender," or social meaning, or
stereotypes, or any of the other things that Title VII properly aims to
change. As the Backus court put it: "'Laws forbidding discrimination in
hiring on the basis of sex do not purport to erase all differences between the
88. City of Philadelphia v. Pa. Human Relations Comm'n, 300 A.2d 97, 103 n.7 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1973).
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sexes. These laws recognize that there are jobs for which one sex is
inherently and biologically more qualified."' 89
Further evidence that these cases are driven by biologized notions of
sex is provided by the few nonprison cases in which courts have rejected
same-sex privacy BFOQs. Courts are evidently reluctant to grant a BFOQ
where job duties do not include direct genital contact or viewing. In EEOC
v. Sedita, a fitness center called "Women's Workout World" claimed that
privacy needs justified its refusal to hire men as managers, assistant
managers, and instructors. 90 The district court rejected this claim, despite
the fact that the fitness center provided as much evidence about customer
preferences as the defendants in Backus and Mercy had. 91 Similarly, in
EEOC v. HI 40 Corp., a court denied a BFOQ defense to a weight-loss
center charged with sex discrimination in the hiring of counselors. In this
case, the defendant insisted that some of her clients, who were
overwhelmingly women, objected to having bodily measurements taken by
men, 92 and did not want to be counseled by men about weight loss and their
associated emotional and relationship troubles.93 The court dismissed
customers' privacy interests in the measurements as "minimal, 9  and
tersely rejected the idea that same-sex privacy extended to the counseling
function.
95
In Olsen v. Marriot International, Inc., when Marriott's Camelback Inn
attempted to justify sex-based hiring of masseuses on privacy grounds,
another federal court was similarly unpersuaded:
Although massage at the Marriott involves touching and
manipulation of intimate areas such as abdominals and inner
thighs .... the legitimate job duties of a massage therapist... do
not include viewing or touching female clients' breasts or either
89. Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (quoting Pa.
Human Relations Comm 'n, 300 A.2d at 103 n.7), vacatedas moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982).
90. EEOC v. Sedita, 755 F. Supp. 808 (N.D. I11. 1991), vacated by 816 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D.
111. 1993).
91. The court found fault with the fact that the defendant did not prove exactly how many
customers would object, exactly what they would object to, and whether their objections would
truly result in a loss of business. "The defendant must prove that clients would stop patronizing
his business if members of the opposite sex are hired." Id. at 811. In Backus, the court accepted a
"factual basis" that consisted of testimony from one patient and eight medical professionals, who
testified about their impressions of patient preferences. Backus, 510 F. Supp. at 1196. In Mercy
Health Center, the court relied upon a written survey of patients with no comment upon its
method or questions, and upon complaints that came not from patients but from the two male
doctors in the ob-gyn department. EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr., 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
159, 163 (W.D. Okla. 1982).
92. These measurements were consensual and nonmandatory, but if a woman chose to have
them done, they involved physical touching at the neck, shoulders, bust, ribs, waist, hips, thigh,
knee, calf, and ankle. EEOC v. HI 40 Corp., 953 F. Supp. 301, 303 (W.D. Mo. 1996).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 304.
95. Id.
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male or female clients' genitalia.... The massage context is
dramatically different from a situation in which legitimate job
duties necessitate washing a patient's genitalia or viewing a third-
party's genitalia .... 96
Olsen only involved an interim order, so the court was not deciding as a
matter of law that there could be no sexual privacy interests at stake in the
massage context. It did, however, find enough doubt to deny defendants'
motion and to imply that Marriott's chances of success were slim. The
reason: Massage does not involve genital contact, and, in search of a
principle to limit the breadth of sex-based privacy claims, the court in Olsen
fixed on the "privates." Massage may involve much more deeply erotic and
intimate associations than a pelvic exam, but the Olsen court was unwilling
to accept the contextual and decisional values of sexual privacy that the
defendant asserted. Thus, the court rejected the claim that anything other
than genital physicality (e.g., a history of sexual abuse, or a sense of
comfort) could generate a privacy interest.
97
All of these cases have a common denominator: The courts use a
particular bodily zone-the "privates"-to delineate the proper scope of the
same-sex private. The genitals stand here as the essence of the private and
the location of fixed sexual difference-that is, the difference that Title VII
cannot, and should not, reach.
This view, however, is puzzling. There is no foreordained or necessary
relationship between anatomy and law. Indeed, equal protection law often
purports to take precisely the opposite view of biology: that the law
properly intervenes only in response to biologically immutable
characteristics. The fact is, biological difference itself tells us nothing about
the difference this difference makes. There are innumerable "biological"
differences-hair color, age, or height, for example-that would not
support privacy claims. Among the same-sex privacy cases, there are
biological differences that make no difference, as between female nurses
and male patients or between female patients and male doctors.
98
Indeed, it is not possible to make sense of same-sex privacy cases
without understanding that genitals are much more than just biology, part of
the body. Consider the claim, put forth in Mercy Health Center, that many
of the delivery room nurses' duties involve some "invasion of the mother's
body."99 Could we not conceive of many other wards in the hospital as
involved in equally if not more "invasive" procedures? Might not open
96. Olsen v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1069 (D. Ariz. 1999).
97. Id. at 1064.
98. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
99. EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr., 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 159, 162 (W.D. Okla.
1982).
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heart surgery, or an appendectomy, be more invasive than a pelvic exam?
Why do we not have privacy interests in the context of brain surgery? The
brain is only matter, one might argue; after all, you cannot see anything
private by looking at a brain. But what does one see in a pelvic exam that is
private? By emphasizing the "invasion" of the genitals, the Olsen court
suggested that they are linked to our person and personality in a way that
even our brains are not. They are, in an unspoken way, gender identity
itself. By protecting zones of the genitals, then, courts protect gendered
constructions of sex, not sex itself-it being in effect impossible to separate
the two."'
It is thus not possible to adequately defend same-sex privacy with
reference to anatomical difference itself. Some courts concede that fact: For
example, in Backus, the court admitted that same-sex privacy was a cultural
matter, but insisted that it was a deeply cultural matter, such that exposing
one's body to the opposite sex "'clashes with a deeply held social, moral
and emotional bias pervading western culture." 0' The court in Local 567
went even further, stating that the same-sex privacy norm was
in fact a cultural thing. But there is no reason why cultural attitudes
cannot be protected .... [S]ince the essence of the matter here
under consideration is personal privacy, there are no imperatives,
no "shoulds" or "shouldn'ts." That is the essence of privacy, that
there is no norm. It is private.
10 2
Here, the dividing line between customer preference and privacy is
marked by the depth of the biases held, and the appellation "privacy"
provides the curtain beyond which courts cannot look. The genital privates
are where antidiscrimination law stops trying to remake gender, not because
nature decrees it, but because culture decrees it. Under this reasoning,
same-sex privacy may be a customer preference, but Title VII should defer
to it because it is a really strong customer preference.'0 3 As Lex Larson's
treatise puts it, "[G]iving respect to deep-seated feelings of personal privacy
involving one's own genital areas is quite a different matter from catering
to the desire of some male airline passengers to have a little diluted sexual
titillation from the hovering presence of an attractive female flight
attendant."
1 04
100. See JuDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 7 (1990); Franke, supra note 53, at 5.
101. Backus v. Baptist Mcd. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1195 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (quoting In re
Long, 127 Cal. Rptr. 732, 736 (Ct. App. 1976)), vacated as moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982).
102. Local 567 Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Michigan, 635 F. Supp.
1010, 1014 n.7 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
103. See, e.g., Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 301 n.23 (N.D. Tex.
1981) (indicating in dicta that "[c]ustomer preference may ... give rise to a [BFOQ] for one sex
where the preference is based upon a desire for sexual privacy").
104. 3 LARSON, supra note 8, § 43.03[3][b], at 43-10.
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This position does not have the logical deficiencies of the same-sex-
privacy-as-biological-law argument. But it does raise a number of
questions. How do we (or courts) know which cultural notions of gender
are beyond the reach of Title VII? If the decisive matter is how "deeply
held" a gender norm is, how do we measure this? (Note too how little
indication there is in same-sex privacy cases that anyone involved is
committed to vigorously testing the contours or depths of customer
preferences.' 05) What does it mean for a court to establish parts of the world
as really male and really female? In many other areas, courts characterize
Title VII as deeply serious about preventing "cultural" notions of gender
from underwriting discrimination in the labor market. Why are cultural
notions, for example, about women's suitability for manual labor, or men's
suitability for care work, not a part of the received wisdom about gender
that Title VII should respect? (Alternatively, don't same-sex privacy cases
reinforce precisely these kinds of meanings about sex?) 106 Is it because
these are not as "deeply" a part of gender as is genital modesty? Even if we
accepted that contentious proposition, why would the kinds of privacy
interests being claimed in the massage or fitness scenario be less real or
important than those claimed in the delivery room? Why should the law
protect our deeply culturally sanctioned wish for bodily modesty, but not
also protect our deeply culturally sanctioned desire to discuss or display
certain parts of our gendered vanity or vulnerability only around members
of the same sex (as in the weight-loss and spa cases)? What does it mean
for the law to delineate a zone of gender that is beyond its reach and allow
it to be used to justify discrimination? Let us postpone these questions for a
moment and explore the other justification that materializes in same-sex
privacy cases: physical and psychological safety.
B. Threat and Sexual Profiling
The other logic of same-sex privacy cases involves sexual profiling:
Courts allow employers to use sex as a criterion in making employment
decisions because they believe that sex is intimately associated with our
sense of identity, risk, and threat. Under this logic, it is not "sex itself' that
is being respected. Instead, courts are trying to respect individuals for
whom sex means certain fundamental, mysterious, and sometimes
dangerous things. The differential distribution of risk of assault between
women and men would then help explain why same-sex privacy rules are
generally not applied to men and why this fact does not give courts pause.
105. See infra note 134.
106. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1278 [Vol. 112: 1257
HeinOnline -- 112 Yale L.J.  1278 2002-2003
Same-Sex Privacy
This line of reasoning is most evident in cases involving children or
individuals incarcerated in institutions or in psychiatric care, where the
psychological and physical vulnerability of individuals is most readily
apparent. So, for example, in City of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Human
Relations Commission, the court approved a same-sex privacy BFOQ,
insisting that the psyches of the children in residence would be put at risk
by cross-sex viewing or contact:
If sex is not "relevant" in the supervision of children who range in
age from seven to sixteen in various stages of undress, where can it
be?
To subject a girl in this age group to a thorough search of her
body by a male supervisor could cause not only a temporary
traumatic condition, but also permanent irreparable harm to her
psyche. It is no different where females supervise male juveniles.
To have a woman supervisor observe daily showers of the boys at a
time in life when sex is a mysterious and often troubling force is to
risk a permanent emotional impairment under the guise ofequality. °
Similarly, in Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hospital, the court
allowed a same-sex privacy BFOQ for the position of child care specialist,
indicating that "due to both therapeutic and privacy concerns, Southwood is
an institution in which the sexual characteristics of the employee are crucial
to the successful performance of the job of child care specialist."'10 8 The
court emphasized therapy much more than privacy, contending, for
example, that .'[riole modeling' ... is an important element of the staffs
job, and a male is better able to serve as a male role model than a female
and vice versa," and that "children who have been sexually abused will
disclose their problems more easily to a member of a certain sex."'
10 9
Indeed, the court's "privacy" concerns seem to add little to its notion of
therapeutic necessity, except for the specter of bodily exposure. Explaining
the "privacy concerns" that the court found sufficient for a BFOQ, the court
said, "[A]dolescent patients have hygiene, menstrual, and sexuality
concerns which are discussed more freely with a staff member of the same
sex. Child patients often must be accompanied to the bathroom, and
sometimes must be bathed.. l l.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
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But what, exactly, do the courts in these two cases think is going to
happen to these children if their same-sex privacy is invaded? Why is being
seen by someone of the opposite sex itself a harm-and what is it a harm
to? In both of these cases, the answer appears to have to do with the state of
vulnerability around sex and sexual identity in which courts perceive
children-and in particular these children-to be. It is as if, because of
either abuse or the "mysteries" of the teenage years, their senses of gender
and sexuality are too fragile to withstand any variation from accepted
norms of modesty and sexuality. To the extent that this is what drives these
cases, they simply return us to the questions above: Ought courts to be in
the business of defending norms of gender themselves-and which ones
ought they defend?
In both of these cases, the courts insisted that individuals have the right
to grow up as properly gendered and modest individuals, but something else
was also clearly at work-an unspoken but looming concern about sexual
abuse. In all same-sex privacy cases, I would contend, anxiety about cross-
sex bodily contact and viewing in some sense reflects fears and realities of
sexual abuse or harassment. In other words, courts that grant same-sex
privacy BFOQs are responding to the notion that allowing physical
exposure between people is more dangerous when they are of different
sexes because they are more likely to abuse one another or more likely to
have been abused by someone of a different sex.
Litigants raise the specter of abuse regularly, particularly in more recent
cases. In Healey, the fact that many of the children in question had been
abused before was clearly important to the court.11" ' Marriott's Camelback
Inn attempted to defend its sex-based hiring with reference to the fact that
some clients had experienced abuse and would be uncomfortable with a
masseuse of the same sex as their abuser." 2 The cases that raise the issue of
sexual threat and abuse in starkest fashion are those where prison
administrators seek same-sex privacy BFOQs to exclude male guards from
female inmates' housing units, in the context of serious and ongoing
allegations of sexual abuse."13 In the most recent such case, Everson v.
Michigan Department of Corrections, prison administrators excluded male
corrections officers from women's housing units shortly after high-profile
cases alleging widespread sexual and physical abuse of female inmates
were settled." 4 According to the reassignment request that prison
111. Id. ("[C]hildren who have been sexually abused will disclose their problems more easily
to a member of a certain sex ... ").
112. Olsen v. Mamott Int'l, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1064 (D. Ariz. 1999).
113. Robino v. Iranon, 145 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1998); Everson v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 222
F. Supp. 2d 864 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
114. See, e.g., Nunn v. Michigan Department of Corrections, No. 96-CV-71416, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22970 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 4, 1997). For more on these cases, see Everson, 222 F. Supp.
2d at 871-72. For more on the history of abuse in Michigan's prisons, see Iman R. Soliman, Male
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administrators filed with the Michigan Department of Civil Services, the
reasons for the exclusion of male corrections officers included security, the
prevention of spurious allegations of abuse, and the belief that the changes
adopted to prevent abuse would "not eliminate inappropriate behavior or
sexual misconduct." ' 15
The Michigan Department of Corrections contended that as long as
there were male corrections officers in the women's housing unit, there
would be assaults-in other words, they engaged in sexual profiling. The
court rejected the argument, but not its premise. They insisted that there
was both no reason to suspect that "all, or substantially all, males are not
able to perform safely and efficiently the duties.., in the housing units in
the female prisons,"'1t 6 and that the fact that "[t]he few [male officers] that
are likely to be involved [in improper activities] does not justify a BFOQ
requirement in the face of federal and state law clearly prohibiting gender
based discrimination."" 1
7
How far we have come from the corporate bathroom in Norwood or the
labor and delivery room in Backus. The defendant in Everson sought a
same-sex privacy BFOQ out of the sense that only the exclusion of men
from certain employment opportunities could guarantee safety for female
inmates. This is sexual profiling, and it surely has to do with "stereotyped
characterizations of the sexes."'1 8 As the court insisted, not all men would
abuse inmates; only some might. And it poses the most difficult question
that the same-sex privacy doctrine has yet been asked to answer. It is
generally claimed that Title VII strongly resists sexual profiling. For
example, the Supreme Court has refused to allow employers to use sex as a
proxy for strength-even though, according to the Court, the strength-sex
correlation might be fairly accurate." 9 But where the cost of rejecting
sexual profiling is potentially so acute, and is also borne disproportionately
by women, ought Title VII take a different view of it?
Officers in Women 's Prisons. The Need for Segregation of Officers in Certain Positions, 10 TEX.
J. WOMEN & L. 45 (2000).
115. Everson, 222 F. Supp. 2d at 877.
116. Id. at 895. Although that finding was sufficient to justify the holding, the court also held
that the prison had not provided enough statistical evidence to suggest that other, less
discriminatory measures could not be employed to meet the desired ends. Id.
117. Id.
118. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977).
119. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 202 (1991) (commenting on Dothard).
EEOC regulations make a similar point, deeming a BFOQ unwarranted in situations involving
"[t]he refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.2(a)(1)(ii) (2001). According to the regulations:
Such stereotypes include, for example, that men are less capable of assembling intricate
equipment; that women are less capable of aggressive salesmanship. The principle of
nondiscrimination requires that individuals be considered on the basis of individual
capacities and not on the basis of any characteristics generally attributed to the group.
Id.
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V. REMAKING SAME-SEX PRIVACY NORMS
Same-sex privacy cases construct a limit to Title VII's strong command
to remake the world of gender where it conflicts with employment equity.
They declare that the norm of same-sex privacy or modesty between the
sexes is beyond the reach of Title VII--except in the context of prisons. But
is this legitimate? Is this a norm that we, or courts, ought to be protecting
from Title VII? Post puts the problem best:
Gender is highly salient in matters of privacy. The sex of the
person by whom we are seen or touched normally matters very
much to us. For this reason, the court in Fesel did not imagine the
plaintiff as an individual whose sex was irrelevant, but instead as a
fully sexed person. Even though the employer in Fesel, like the
employer in Wilson, sought to maintain a single-sex work force,
Fesel accepted the gender-specific stereotypes implicit in the
privacy norms invoked by the nursing home, and the court
incorporated these stereotypes into the BFOQ exception of Title
VII.
Fesel illustrates how Title VII does not simply displace gender
practices, but rather interacts with them in a selective manner. The
case forces us to ask which gender practices are to be reshaped by
Title VII, in what contexts, and in what ways.
1 20
If these cases force us to ask these questions, can reading them help us
answer them? I contend that it can-but only if we read them not only for
their immediate discriminatory impact (for example, whether the doctrine
disadvantages women in the labor market as it is applied), but also for the
gendered meanings that they instantiate and protect, and for what they
imply about the costs of changing any particular set of gendered meanings.
Reading same-sex privacy cases in this way suggests two principles
that should determine whether a particular gender norm ought to be subject
to or protected by Title VII. First, gender norms ought to be contested
where they materially or symbolically subordinate those that Title VII was
established to defend. But same-sex privacy cases also highlight the costs
associated with using the law to change gender norms. The second
principle, then, is that we should consider the costs that changing norms
imposes upon those that antidiscrimination law seeks to protect to decide
when and how to attempt these changes.
120. Post, supra note 29, at 26 (footnote omitted).
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A. Material and Symbolic Subordination
It has become commonplace to articulate two competing definitions of
antidiscrimination: one based upon an "antidifferentiation" principle, which
sees legally authorized classifications as discriminatory, and the other based
upon an "antisubordination" principle, which holds that "both facially
differentiating and facially neutral policies are invidious only if they
perpetuate racial or sexual hierarchy."'121 This distinction was developed
predominantly around the fault line of affirmative action cases, in order to
make the (in my view, entirely legitimate) point that "[i]t is more invidious
for women or blacks to be treated worse than white men than for men or
whites to be treated worse than black women under this perspective,
because of the differing histories and contexts of subordination faced by
these groups."'
122
But to ask the question "antidifferentiation or antisubordination?" is
already to purport to answer precisely the question at stake in same-sex
privacy cases: "When is differentiation subordinating?" One obvious
answer is when differentiation results in materially worse outcomes for
women. Thus, in same-sex privacy cases we could measure the projected
impact of the same-sex privacy rule upon women's participation in the
labor market and object to the norm because, for example, in the prison
context, "privacy considerations reduce female employment opportunities
because approximately ninety-five percent of the prisoners are male,"' 23 or
because, in the nursing context, they reproduce the structure of demand that
has relegated women to lower-paid care work.
2 4
There is, however, a less obvious answer suggested by the same-sex
privacy cases. These cases suggest that we must measure discrimination not
only materially, but also symbolically. They also indicate that we should
consider symbolic subordination not as a derivative or second-order form of
discrimination, but as a source of material subordination. 125 Thus, to decide
whether it is subordinating or discriminatory for the law to protect a core of
"common sense" 126 gender meanings, we must measure not only the direct
121. Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1003, 1007-08 (1986),
122. id. at 1009.
123. Calloway, supra note 46, at 331.
124. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
125. I use the term "symbolic" to designate the order of language and representation. The
notion that the symbolic order does not represent the real order, but rather produces it, is typically
associated with linguistic and semiotic theory as articulated, for example, by Jacques Lacan. See
Jacqueline Rose, Introduction-11, in FEMALE SEXUALITY: JACQUES LACAN AND THE ECOLE
FREUDIENNE 27, 31-32 (Juliet Mitchell & Jacqueline Rose eds. & Jacqueline Rose trans., 1985).
126. City of Philadelphia v. Pa. Human Relations Comm'n, 300 A.2d 97, 103 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1973).
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impact upon the labor market caused by respect for such norms, but also the
kinds of legal subjects that these norms call forth.
Consider, then, the gendered meanings that same-sex privacy cases
establish. First, they construct women's bodies as more private than men's,
by insisting that women have an inviolable "right" to same-sex privacy that
men do not. Employers regularly treat the sexual privacy rights of men and
women very differently in sexual privacy cases,1 7 in a way that resonates
uncomfortably with the historical construction of women's bodies and
concerns as the domain of the private rather than public sphere.
128
It is well established that the legal construction of the family as a sphere
of "privacy" has facilitated the ongoing physical abuse of women within the
home. 129 To put this in symbolic terms, the problem with the privatization
of the domestic sphere is not just that it results in an immediate failure to
protect women's right to bodily integrity, but also that it constructs women
as semiprivatized subjects, subjects of a kind of violence that can have no
political articulation.
In the same-sex privacy context, when courts treat women's bodies as
more private than men's, they are not forbidding the law from taking
cognizance of violence against women. (In fact, they may implicitly be
doing just the opposite, as we shall discuss momentarily.) But the symbolic
order that courts construct is nonetheless problematic because it relies upon
notions of bodily modesty and chastity that have long operated to deny
women sexual autonomy. As privacy scholar Anita Allen has noted,
"Conventions of female chastity and modesty have shielded women in a
mantle of privacy at a high cost to sexual choice and self-expression.'
130
Consider the meanings that the famed sexologist Havelock Ellis attached to
127. See, e.g., Forts v. Ward 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980); Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510
F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated as moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982). But see Jones v.
Hinds Gen. Hosp., 666 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (supporting an employer's dismissal of
female nurses rather than male orderlies because there were more nurses than orderlies, and
orderlies had to be on hand to perform "intimate functions" for male patients).
128. For many feminists, "privacy" is inherently suspect, and "connote[s] conditions of
female confinement and subjugation in the home." Anita L. Allen, Taking Liberties: Privacy,
Private Choice, and Social Contract Theory, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 461, 470 (1987) (referring
specifically to Susan Moller Okin and Jean Bethke Elshtain); see also CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 93, 101-02 (1987) (arguing that privacy rhetoric reinforces
the "separate spheres" ideology that has traditionally subordinated women); Rhonda Copelon,
Unpacking Patriarchy: Reproduction, Sexuality, Originalism, and Constitutional Change, in A
LESS THAN PERFECT UNION: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 303, 314
(Jules Lobel ed., 1988) (contending that the privacy doctrine "has reinforced the original
distinction between public and private that has been essential to the patriarchal differentiation of
male from female, the family from the state and market, the superior from the inferior, the
measure from the other").
129. As Reva Siegel has pointed out, when husbands lost the legal right to physically
"chastise" their wives, judges regularly cited privacy as reason to continue to grant husbands
immunity to charges of assault. Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative
and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2150-74 (1996),
130. Allen, supra note 128, at 471.
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modesty, that "especially... feminine trait."' 31 Modesty, according to Ellis,
is "closely connected with the more passive part in sex activity played
generally by the female,"' 32 a product of "the primitive animal gesture of
sexual refusal on the part of the female," as well as of disgust, fear, the
repression and arousal of male desire, and "the conception of women as
property." 3 To the extent that same-sex privacy cases turn on notions of
natural and essential female modesty, then, they lend authority to, rather
than disrupt, a troublesome set of meanings.134
These cases also cast feminine modesty as something ancillary to law,
when it might more properly be considered a product of law. Consider, for
example, the history of sumptuary laws, which regulated the kind of
clothing that people could wear. These laws were "enforced
overwhelmingly against women,"'135 and "exhibited a preoccupation, in the
name of modesty and morality, with female necklines, and, to a lesser
extent, with exposed backs."'1 36 They were preoccupied with women's legs
too: In the 1920s, when a fashion for shorter skirts hit the United States,
several states introduced bills to regulate them, requiring, for example, that
skirts not be shorter than three inches above the ankle.' 37 The norms about
bodily exposure that the courts identify as "natural" are thus anything but
that.
131. HAVELOCK ELLIS, PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX 336 (1946).
132. Id. at 337.
133. Id. at 36.
134. Consider, for example, that among the evidence the court in Backus held proved a
"factual basis" for the BFOQ granted in that case was one doctor's testimony that half of her
female patients "and even a greater percentage of their husbands" would object to a male nurse.
Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1196 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated as moot, 671
F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982). Note too how the modesty regime's denial of female agency resonates
with the coercive cast of same-sex privacy cases. In cases like Backus, Fesel, and Mercy Health
Center, same-sex privacy is a command, not a choice. By allowing hospitals to discriminate
against all male nurses, courts promote a regime where no woman will have the option of
choosing a male nurse, and where women are cast as unable to assert effectively their own
interests in same-sex privacy. In these cases, courts spend little time asking after the expressed
interests of the women whose privacy is ostensibly at stake, instead allowing employers, medical
professionals, and the courts themselves largely to decide what women want. For example, to
provide a "factual basis" that hiring male nurses would fatally undermine their business, Baptist
Medical Center presented evidence from one patient and eight medical professionals, who
testified about their impressions of patient preferences. Id. at 1196. The only official complaints
cited in Mercy Health Center came not from patients, but rather from the two male doctors. 29
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 159, 161 (W.D. Okla. 1982). By insisting that women must have
female nurses, and by not demanding rigorous evidence of female patients' preferences, courts
suggest that it is not important to ask women whether they want same-sex privacy. The norm of
same-sex privacy that courts instantiate operates as a kind of "coerced privacy," as Anita Allen
defines the term. Anita L. Allen, Coerced Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 729 (1999)
(defining coerced privacy as a norm imposed "to make sure everyone lives in accordance with a
particular vision of privacy").
135. ALAN HUNT, GOVERNANCE OF THE CONSUMING PASSIONS 214 (1996).
136. Id. at 222.
137. Id. at 234 (citing JAMES LAVER, MODESTY IN DRESS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
FUNDAMENTALS OF FASHION (1969)).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003] 1285
HeinOnline -- 112 Yale L.J.  1285 2002-2003
The Yale Law Journal
Same-sex privacy also has symbolic implications beyond the context of
sex. By authorizing the exclusion of male nurses in contexts where male
doctors are the rule, same-sex privacy doctrine implicitly endorses a
troubling regime of privacy that is shot through with discriminatory
attitudes about class and possibly race.'38 The presumption is, of course,
that women do not mind male doctors but they do mind male nurses-just
as courts like the one in Fesel insist that men do not mind female nurses.
But this is plainly less a judgment about "privacy" than about the
comparative likelihood of those lower down in status hierarchies to be
professional with, and respectful of, clients. The flip side of this point is
represented in the prison cases. Courts have been more solicitous of the
privacy interests of white collar men who fear that a cleaning woman might
knock on their bathroom door 3 9 than of the privacy interests of women and
men incarcerated in prisons that are often the site of severe violations of
physical and sexual integrity. 140 Part of the reason, I contend, is that
"common sense" norms of gender are much more likely to seem persuasive
and important to protect in genteel settings like nursing homes or the
Standard Oil building than in settings such as prisons.
Third, cases like Backus foreclose the notion that people experience
their bodies, genders, and sexualities in different ways. When courts base
same-sex privacy decisions upon "[t]he biological difference[s] between
men and women which in turn produce psychological differences," 14' they
insist that sexes, bodies, and, implicitly, sexualities line up in consistent and
predictable ways. By treating same-sex privacy as if it were a product of
biology or uncontestable gender norms, courts create an inner truth of sex,
mobilizing the resources of the law to disavow the law's role in
constructing these same norms. Same-sex privacy cases partake of what
Katherine Franke calls a legal belief in the truth of "biological sexual
difference" and "sexual identity [that] inevitably reifies masculinity as the
natural expression of male subjectivity and femininity as the natural
expression of female subjectivity.'
142
138. One cannot tell anything certain about the race of employees and third parties in these
cases. It would stand to reason, however, given the fact that the labor market is also stratified by
race, that the perceived differences between male nurses and male doctors also reflect perceptions
about race, privacy, and sexual aggression or danger.
139. Norwood v. Dale, 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1422 (N.D. Il1. 1984).
140. See, e.g., Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1216 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that women
inmates' privacy interests could be adequately protected by pajamas and fifteen-minute periods
where inmates were allowed to cover the windows to their cells). On the severe sexual abuse
endemic to women's prisons, see AMNESTY INT'L, NOT PART OF MY SENTENCE: VIOLATIONS OF
THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY (1999), at http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/
indexIAMR510011999.
141. City of Philadelphia v. Pa. Human Relations Cornm'n, 300 A.2d 97, 103 n.7 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1973).
142. Franke, supra note 53, at 4.
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This refusal to acknowledge or account for variation in sexual identity
and sexuality dismisses many people's experiences of sexuality and sex.
While we should pause before adopting wholesale the notion that norms of
same-sex privacy are at their core about sexuality, 143 it is also the case, as
one court has stated, that the same-sex privacy norm "appear[s] to assume
that all of the relevant actors are heterosexual., 144 Same-sex sexual privacy
doctrine participates in the closeting of homosexuality because it presumes
everyone to experience their gender, their sexuality, and their bodies in the
same way, the "right" way. The insistent heterosexual presumption behind
the same-sex-as-private norm is insensible to the history and mechanics of
homophobia, 145 and also to any interests in cross-sex sexual privacy that
individuals might have.
Same-sex privacy cases call forth legal subjects that are defined by an
essentialized bodily modesty, one that is gendered female. They also
imagine women as constitutively vulnerable to sexualized assault (again,
from lower-class men-but not from women, or men higher up on the
professionalism scale) and as unable to protect themselves. They produce
legal subjects along a grid of "an idealized and compulsory
heterosexuality." t 46 They suggest that those higher up in class and
professionalism hierarchies are less likely to abuse their positions. How
exactly, and to what extent, these symbolic constructions effectively
interpellate us are important questions that cannot be resolved here. My
claim is simply that the norms involved create a world of gender meanings
that have real and discriminatory effects, which we ought to resist.
B. The Costs of Changing Gender Norms
Ought we, then, simply refuse to shelter same-sex privacy norms from
Title VII? The prison cases suggest tempering this impulse with another
one that would attend to who bears the costs of changing gender norms.
Consider the costs of changing the norm of same-sex privacy for one
143. If the "modesty" norm is gendered, as discussed above, then we should expect that
norms about gender, not just norms about sexuality, are in opcration in scenes of same-sex
privacy. Thus, we ought not replace the same-sex-as-private norm with a same-sexuality privacy
norm (e.g., allowing gay men "sexual privacy" from other gay men) or a sex-of-object-choice
privacy norm (e.g., allowing lesbians sexual privacy from other women).
144. Canedy v. Boardman. 16 F.3d 183, 185 n.1 (7th Cir. 1994).
145. It is clear that "same-sex" does not always mean "private," especially in environments
that are fixated on the fantasmatic dangers that homosexuals pose to others. As Kendall Thomas
has noted, the debate on gays in the military, occupied with anxiety about the penetrating same-
sex gaze, offers us a window into one such institution. Kendall Thomas, Shower/Closet, 20
ASSEMBLAGE 80, 80 (1993) ("From the media stories on heterosexuals in the armed forces who
oppose President Clinton's proposal to lift the ban on the inclusion of 'avowed' homosexuals in
their ranks, it would seem that straight male soldiers and sailors are haunted by the specter of the
'gay look,"').
146. BUTLER, supra note 100, at 135.
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woman in a California prison: When male prison guards were assigned to
conduct random, clothed body searches of female inmates and she was
forced to undergo one against her will, she was so distressed that "her
fingers had to be pried loose from the bars she had grabbed; she returned to
her cell-block, vomited, and broke down."'147 We could insist, of course,
that her reaction was a kind of false consciousness, that she was
misidentifying all men as a threat, or at least misidentifying this man as a
threat. There is a way in which these things in fact might be true-but is
this the place to make that point? Would it be possible, in a context in
which approximately eighty-five percent of women have been sexually or
physically abused by men, 148 to remake associations between gender and
assault by ignoring them?
If Title VII is about transforming practices of gender, same-sex privacy
cases suggest that we must not only decide which gender norms to change,
but where and how to change them. But what does it mean to say that we
ought to take the "costs" of changing gender norms into account?
The following account is necessarily schematic, but it attempts to
outline an answer to this question. It suggests that there is a very limited
category of costs with which we ought to be concerned, for the same reason
that the BFOQ provision has been declared a narrow exception to Title VII:
A broader scope would eviscerate the statute, and fatally undermine our
ability to use antidiscrimination law to change discriminatory gender
meanings. But our consideration should not end where we identify a
cognizable cost. In almost every case, individuals and employers can avoid
or substantially mitigate the costs in question. Indeed, where such costs are
a concern, same-sex privacy BFOQs are likely to be an inadequate response
to the concerns identified. This suggests that if we value employment equity
(as Title VII suggests that we do) and are worried about the symbolic
effects of the same-sex privacy BFOQ as it is currently constructed (as I
have suggested that we ought to be), then rarely, if ever, will a same-sex
privacy BFOQ be appropriate.
Because gender means so many things to us, changing gender norms is
likely to occasion innumerable kinds of costs. Same-sex privacy cases
suggest a few on which to focus: the discomfort associated with adapting to
changed employment roles for women and men, the distress associated with
challenges to our sense of gendered modesty and propriety, and the anxiety
147. Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1534 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J., concurring). The
Ninth Circuit held that the Eighth Amendment prevented male guards from performing body
searches of women in this facility, stating that such searches involved the wanton infliction of
pain, given the history of severe and endemic abuse experienced by women inmates in the facility.
Id. at 1531 (majority opinion).
148. Id. at 1539 n.14 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
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associated with the sense of exposure to risk of sexual assault and
harassment.
The first category of cost is in evidence in the labor and delivery room
cases, where men are acceptable as doctors but not as nurses. It may be that
asking women (and men) to accept men as nurses causes distress, but that
distress itself simply cannot count for much when we are considering when
and how to challenge discriminatory gender norms in the workplace. Where
the cost in question is a fact of changing norms about gendered employment
themselves, we ought no more accept it as applied to male nurses than
female flight attendants.
The second category of costs, distress about gendered propriety and
modesty, is probably in evidence in most-if not all-of the same-sex
privacy cases. But here too we are faced with something that might be
considered a transaction cost of antidiscrimination law. There is no way to
articulate the costs of changing norms of same-sex modesty except as an
expression of gender norms themselves-the "same-sex" aspect of this
proves it. Once we decide that this norm is among those that Title VII
properly seeks to change, then the costs of changing this regime--even
where these costs are disproportionately borne by women-must be an
inadequate reason to reject the attempt to transform it.
The last cost suggested by these cases is anxiety about sexual assault
and harassment-and it is also the only one of the three that ought give us
serious pause. We ought to distinguish between two forms of this cost: one
associated with the fact that assault or harassment may occur in scenes of
cross-sex bodily exposure and the other associated with the fear of assault,
or in more extreme cases, the sense that cross-sex exposure itself is
assaulting. Everson v. Michigan Department of Corrections can serve as an
emblem of the first dilemma. 149 Ought women bear the risk of sexual
assault and harassment that history gives us reason to expect male guards
will perpetrate more often than female guards? Surely not-but as we will
discuss momentarily, there is no reason that they should have to.
The cost associated with the fear of assault in the prison, the labor and
delivery room, the psychiatric ward, or the nursing home is a more difficult
case. These anxieties too are likely to redound primarily to women, given
the disproportionate burden that sexual assault and sexualized fear impose
upon women. But in their more attenuated forms, these fears, like the
regime of gendered modesty, are part of those gender norms that Title VII
might rightfully seek to change, and thus, as with the costs of changing
norms about modesty, cannot be considered grounds to abandon the project
of changing subordinating gender meanings. However, the more extreme
versions of this fear, such as are reflected in the above account from Jordan
149. See supra text accompanying note 146.
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v. Gardner, "0 might be judged differently because they suggest that some
individuals experience cross-sex exposure or touching itself as an assault.
Without naturalizing the sense of gender-based trauma that such responses
are said to arise out of, we nonetheless might agree that these costs are
among those few we should take into account.
Taking note of such costs puts us in a double-bind, asking us to mediate
between the discriminatory effects of a norm and the disproportionate
burden placed on subordinated individuals that the attempt to transform the
norm can have. But we are not required to choose between two kinds of
discriminatory effect. There is a third way suggested by the third prong of
the same-sex privacy test that most courts already use, which requires
employers to show that there are no reasonable alternatives to a sex-based
hiring policy.'5 1 The foregoing suggests that courts ought to take this prong
of the test much more seriously-not only to protect individuals from
employment discrimination, but also to protect them from the things that we
worry about when we talk about privacy. Thus, where the attempt to change
gender norms occasions cognizable costs, we ought still attend to two
things: alternatives that employers can adopt and the degree of mitigation
that individuals themselves can exercise. As for the first, consider the one
cost that it seems evident we want to avoid: increased incidence of sexual
assault or harassment. It simply cannot be the case that the exclusion of one
sex from particular job duties will be necessary or sufficient to prevent this
risk, for two reasons: If there is risk of such misconduct, it will not only
inhere in locations of bodily exposure, and it will not only inhere between
sexes. As the Everson court noted, improper conduct occurs among all male
staff members in the prisons in question, and "there appears to be no firm
evidence that it is principally found among the [guards excluded from] the
housing units."'152 Furthermore, one of the premises of this Note is that
sexual abuse and attraction do not simply occur between individuals of
opposite sexes. Same-sex privacy norms can only successfully defend
individuals from a particular kind of assault and harassment-the kind that
happens in scenes of genital exposure between different sexes. But consider
the sexual profiling question from the perspective of male inmates. As a
commentator recently noted:
[U]ndoubtedly because of long-standing stereotypes as to sexual
conduct and aggression between men and women, the court cases,
and the policies of prison authorities involve only situations where
150. 986 F.2dat 1534.
151. See Jennings v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 786 F. Supp. 376, 380-81 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), aff'd, 977 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1992); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del-, Inc., 447 F. Supp.
1346, 1351 (D. Del. 1978), affdmem., 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979).
152. Everson v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 222 F. Supp. 2d 864, 872 n.12 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
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the safety of female inmates is allegedly threatened by the presence
of male guards.... It is widely recognized that male inmates fear
homosexual attacks and that body cavity searches often make
inmates feel humiliated and vulnerable to a homosexual assault.'53
Despite the fact that male guards appear to be responsible for a
considerable proportion of sexual assaults against male inmates,' 54 there is
no evidence, in case law or otherwise, that prison administrators are
attempting to remove male guards from male housing units.' 55 At the same
time, concern about the possibility of sexual abuse is increasingly cited as a
reason that male guards must be removed from women's housing units. 1
5 6
This is not to say that the best answer to sexual assaults in prison is to
remove men from all guard positions-quite the opposite. It is to suggest
that in almost every case, sex-neutral measures-for example, improving
reporting systems and prosecutions-will likely be more effective at
protecting inmates from sexual assault and harassment (as well as other
kinds of abuse) than sexual profiling.1
57
Second, we ought to be less concerned about asking individuals to bear
costs where they possess the resources to mitigate the costs themselves.
Where individuals are in particularly vulnerable situations-for example, in
residential care, psychiatric wards, or prisons-we ought to be more
concerned about imposing costs upon them. Where individuals have
extensive resources at their disposal to manage the costs of changing gender
norms-either by avoiding them (e.g., by changing hospitals) or by
ameliorating their effects (e.g., by asking for a chaperone)-we ought to be
more comfortable with asking them to bear costs. Currently, we impose the
153. Ingram, supra note 78, at 19 (citations omitted).
154. A recent study surveying nearly 10,000 staff and inmates in four Midwestern states
found that about 20% of alleged assaults against male inmates were perpetrated by staff. Cindy
Struckman-Johnson & David Struckman-Johnson, Sexual Coercion Rates in Seven Midwestern
Prison Facilities for Men, 80 PRISON J. 379, 389 (2000); see also Cindy Struckman-Johnson et
al., Sexual Coercion Reported by Men and Women in Prison, 33 J. SEX RES. 67, 71 (1996)
(indicating that 18% of reported assaults against male inmates in one Midwestern facility were
perpetrated by guards). It is possible to infer that male guards were more commonly the
perpetrators in this latter study: Guard assaults were 18% of the total assaults, and women were
the reported perpetrators in only 2% of these same assaults (women and men together were
alleged perpetrators in another 5%). Id.; see also Teresa A. Miller, Keeping the Government's
Hands off Our Bodies: Mapping a Feminist Legal Theory Approach to Privacy in Cross-Gender
Prison Searches, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 861, 864 (2001) (noting that "judges tend to deploy
privacy primarily as a means of protecting sexually vulnerable women-both guards and
prisoners-from sexually aggressive men" and as a result fail to acknowledge "the sexual
vulnerability of male prisoners").
155. See Ingram, supra note 78, at 12.
156. See, e.g., Everson, 222 F. Supp. 2d at 885, 897; see also David W. Chen, After Abuse
Charges, Westchester Bars Male Guards from Women 's Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2000, at B4
(reporting that Westchester County Executive Andrew J. Spano stated that he wished to protect
female inmates from further sexual abuse and "announced today that male guards would be barred
from working in the women's quarters of the county jail").
157. For a list of such possible measures, see Everson, 222 F. Supp. 2d at 871-72.
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highest costs on those with the fewest resources-women (and sometimes
men) in prison. In truth, however, this trend ought to be inverted-so that
those with the least resources to manage the impact of changing gender
norms are no longer on the front lines while those with every resource are
staunchly protected.
Finally, the above considerations suggest that we ought to attend to
these costs only very rarely as a justification for defending same-sex
privacy BFOQs, but regularly as a demonstration of the accommodations
that will be necessary both to transform our notions of gender and to avoid
disproportionately imposing the costs upon those with the fewest choices
and resources. To acknowledge that there are costs associated with
changing norms of gender does not mean that we ought to renounce the
project of changing them; quite the contrary. It suggests first that we ought
to minimize these costs where we are concerned about them, and only
second-if at all-that we ought to authorize sex segregation to avoid them.
There is, after all, also a cost associated with the status quo, as the previous
Section has attempted to demonstrate.
VI. CONCLUSION
Same-sex privacy cases cannot be justified as a simple act of statutory
interpretation, nor as a logical extension of the privacy rights that
sometimes attach to scenes of bodily exposure. They demonstrate, rather,
that when courts interpret Title VII's BFOQ exception, they are arbitrating
between the gender norms that antidiscrimination law ought to try to
change and those norms that it ought to protect. By protecting same-sex
privacy, courts, I have argued, are protecting norms about gender where
these preferences are seen as deeply rooted in our culture and sense of self,
or as a means of profiling risks of sexual assault or abuse.
The question, then, is not "ought Title VII protect norms about gender"
(for the norm that gender is irrelevant is, of course, a norm too), but rather
"which norms ought it protect?" I have suggested that we answer this by
examining which norms have a materially and symbolically subordinating
effect upon women. But we must also consider when and how to challenge
such norms. I have contended that we should consider the potential effects
of transforming gender norms upon the people we change them through-
but more often as a step toward finding non-sex-segregatory measures to
mitigate potential harms than as a factor legitimating a BFOQ.
Applying these principles to same-sex privacy cases would allow courts
to dispense with their awkward insistence that privacy rights require the
granting of a same-sex privacy BFOQ. It would also encourage them to
stop attributing these norms to biology or unchangeable notions of gender,
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and to admit instead that same-sex privacy is a socially and legally
constituted practice of gender that the law can, and does, influence.
Instead of arguing from inalienable privacy or biological law, courts
could concede that same-sex privacy is a gendered norm and a customer
preference-and one that levies particular costs against women, while
potentially sparing them others. They could then weigh openly the symbolic
and material costs and benefits of changing gender norms in the context at
issue. Thus, rather than deny that norms (and customer preferences) are at
stake in cases like Backus, Fesel, or Everson, courts would admit that they
are, but that we must consider what the costs of these norms are, and who
ought to bear the cost of changing them.
This Note seeks more to provide a structure for same-sex privacy
inquiries than to offer a series of conclusions about how they should be
decided. We ought, I have suggested, be much more critical of the notion of
"same-sex privacy" than courts have been to date, and attend to the kinds of
subjects and harms that we are imagining when we talk about same-sex
privacy. In the washroom cases and the labor and delivery room cases,
where "modesty" or the avoidance of "tension" is all that can recommend
the current regime, such an analysis will almost certainly militate against a
BFOQ. Other cases suggest more caution-for example, where individuals
have very little volition over the circumstances in which they participate in
the changing of gender norms. Here, we ought to consider potential costs to
both bodily and psychical integrity, but also recognize that regulating sex is
not the same thing as regulating harm, anxiety, or the possibility of sexual
abuse. In almost all cases, systemic rather than sex-segregationist
approaches will likely provide better prophylaxis against abuse and anxiety
about abuse because they will better serve to correct power imbalances that
generate risk of abuse and that make abuse so injurious.
Finally, there is no way to decide, a priori, the answers to all of the
questions proposed in this Note, but this is simply to say that there is a role
for judgment and for courts as we know them. It is my hope, finally, that
the preceding discussion has served at least to illuminate some of the
unexamined meanings that same-sex privacy cases carry with them, and to
explicate some of what it would mean to try to change them.
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